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Abstract: The Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research (IUI) 
was founded in 1939. In less than ten years, IUI grew from a small survey 
bureau to a leading research institute focused on microeconomic research 
relevant to industrial development. Based on a number of new 
commemorative essays and biographies written by or about former IUI 
researchers published in Henrekson (2009), this essay describes the 
Institute’s accomplishments and the particular research environment at 
IUI. It also discusses the conditions conducive to a creative, productive 
research environment. While most of these accounts do not extend beyond 
the end of the 1970s, the insights provided are highly relevant for 
contemporary research institutes.  
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Seventy years have passed since the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social 
Research (Industriens Utredningsinstitut, IUI) was founded. Despite 
considerable skepticism and resistance from leading circles of the business 
world, 1939 saw the realization of legendary ASEA president Sigfrid Edström’s 
conviction that Swedish enterprise needed its own qualified research institute. 
IUI—renamed IFN in 2006
1—has been a leading institution in applied research 
in Sweden, and has also figured prominently in economic policy debate since its 
inception. 
 
In celebration of the Institute’s 70th anniversary, more than 30 former IUI 
researchers were invited to reflect upon the impact their time at IUI had on their 
personal and professional development. These contributions, together with 
several essays about former IUI CEOs and chairmen, have been compiled in 
Henrekson (2009).  
 
This essay uses this material to explore two questions. First, what made the 
research environment at IUI so special? Second, which conditions create and 
maintain a creative, productive research environment? 
 
A number of key personalities in the Institute’s history figure in this account. 
Most Swedish readers would readily recognize them, but the appendix includes 
brief biographies of these people to aid non-Swedish readers. 
 
What was accomplished at IUI?  
Very little systematic empirical research was pursued in Sweden prior to the late 
1920s. At that point in time Gösta Bagge, professor at Stockholm University, 
initiated a massive empirical project on national income and long-term 
economic growth in Sweden financed by the Rockefeller Foundation (Sandelin 
1991). The project included the construction of consistent data series on wages, 
cost of living, national income and other key economic variables in Sweden 
from 1860 to 1930 (Bagge et al. 1933–37). It turned out that the project 
                                                 
1 The English name of IUI was the Industrial Institute for Economic and Social Research until 
1996, when the English name was changed to the Research Institute of Industrial Economics. It 
has usually been referred to as IUI in English. The Swedish name was changed to Institutet för 
Näringslivsforskning in 2006; since then, the new abbreviation IFN has been used.   2 
provided a good training ground in doing empirical work for a number of young 
Swedish economists, among them Erik Lundberg and Ingvar Svennilson.  
 
At the end of the decade two empirically-oriented research institutes were 
founded: the governmental National Institute of Economic Research 
(Konjunkturinstitutet, KI) in 1937, and IUI two years thereafter. Headed by Erik 
Lundberg, KI concentrated on macroeconomic and public sector issues. For its 
part, IUI came to concentrate on the study of the determinants of industry 
growth. The Institute focused on individual companies and their owners very 
early. During Ingvar Svennilson’s stint as CEO in 1941–49, IUI was quickly 
transformed into a research institute with an academically qualified staff.
2 
According to Svante Nycander (2005, 126), IUI and KI had «the reputation of 
being the country’s foremost economic research institutes in the 1940s». 
 
Few people in Sweden earned a Ph.D. in Economics before the 1970s. Eight 
doctorates were granted during the 1940s, and the number remained low in the 
1950s and 60s with a total of 16 and 18 new doctorates, respectively (Wadensjö 
1992). Moreover, no university institution offered regular postgraduate studies 
at this time. In light of this, it is impressive that eleven doctoral dissertations and 
fifteen licentiate dissertations were written at the Institute during its first 30 
years (Nabseth 1969).
3 IUI became thus an important site of education for 
economists. 
 
With Ingvar Svennilson as CEO, IUI spearheaded the governmental Swedish 
Medium Term Surveys (Långtidsutredningarna, LU). In fact, Svennilson was 
chairman of the first commission (Åberg 2009). Moreover, IUI produced the so-
called Industrial Supplement (Industribilagan) in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Finance through the beginning of the 1970s. IUI Deputy Director 
Erik Höök was appointed Director of Planning at the Ministry of Finance, with 
responsibility for precisely these medium term surveys.
4 The surveys came to 
                                                 
2 Ingvar Svennilson’s contributions are described by Persson and Siven (2009). 
3 Before it became common to submit papers to international academic journals, writing 
dissertations for a Ph.D. or Licentiate degree substituted for the external scrutiny provided by 
the peer review process.  
4 Erik Höök defended a dissertation written at IUI on public sector expansion (Höök 1962).   3 
play a central role in Swedish economic policy making for several decades to 
come (Bergman, Heikensten and Lundgren 1991).  
 
Yet IUI’s collaboration with the government ended in the beginning of the 
1970s, when political polarization made continued collaboration all but 
impossible (Wohlin 2009). At this point, IUI began conducting alternative 
Swedish medium term surveys (called Långtidsbedömningar), continuing for 
another two decades. 
 
IUI also compiled new statistics for core economic areas such as construction 
(Salaj 1968), and the use of time in households (Klevmarken 2009). Statistics 
Sweden (SCB) has since assumed and further developed these IUI initiatives. 
However, IUI continued to compile and analyze unique data about Swedish 
enterprise. Birgitta Swedenborg, for example, began assembling a 
comprehensive database of the operations of multinational companies (e.g., 
Swedenborg 1979).
5 These data—unique in an international perspective as 




Through the end of the 1960s, IUI produced a considerable amount of studies 
that directly affected company decision making—see Wohlin (2009) for an 
overview. For instance, Göran Albinsson Bruhner (2009) describes how the 
automobile, chemicals, and construction industries eagerly referenced industry 
studies and research reports. 
 
Readers of older IUI studies are often struck by the skillful use of fundamental 
microeconomic theory, as well as the elegant style of writing. According to John 
Skår (2009), IUI was unique in Europe in the 1960s in this regard, comparable 
to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, founded in 1920) in the 
United States. Indeed, the origins of the two institutions are similar: both were 
                                                 
5 Among other things, it was shown that Swedish companies’ investments in foreign countries 
did not negatively affect Swedish export. It consequently deposed the reason behind Swedish 
restrictions on outward foreign direct investment (Swedenborg 2009). 
6 See, for example, Andersson et al. (1996), Ekholm and Hakkala (2007), Heyman et al. (2007), 
and Norbäck (2001).    4 
established to collect, analyze, and disseminate facts concerning significant 
policy issues. 
 
As underscored by Ove Granstrand (2009) among others, IUI has always been 
characterized by its dynamic perspective on economic problems and its ambition 
to analyze the interplay between micro- and macroeconomic factors. This was 
groundbreaking, especially because microeconomics and macroeconomics were 
largely separate subdisciplines until the 1970s. Granstrand maintains that the 
Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) was the only other 
research institute to encourage a similar approach. 
 
At the beginning of the 1970s, IUI followed the lead set by Erik Dahmén’s 
(1950a, 1970) dissertation on industrial enterprise and began research on the 
individual company and its founder-entrepreneur. IUI was the first institute in 
Sweden to conduct research in this area. Gunnar Du Rietz worked in Dahmén’s 
footsteps throughout the 1970s, studying the causes and significance of firm 
entry in the Swedish postwar era (Du Rietz 1980; Hause and Du Rietz 1984). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Bo Carlsson and Gunnar Eliasson studied 
entrepreneurship and industrial development. IUI was a forerunner in both 
Sweden and the world in this respect as well; these issues escaped serious 
international attention until the publication of David Birch’s study in 1979. 
Dahmén’s dissertation on structural change and economic development—which 
he wrote at IUI during the most of the 1940s—significantly contributed to what 
has been identified as a uniquely Swedish research tradition (Carlsson and 
Henriksson 1991; Pålsson Syll 1995; Johansson and Karlson 2002).  
 
Yet the Institute’s notability did not inspire the same feeling of prominence 
among its researchers, resulting in a culture of restraint when it came to 
―selling‖ results. Villy Bergström (2009), for instance, describes how Ragnar 
Bentzel made fundamental contributions that were only published in an obscure 
Festschrift in Swedish.
7 Siv Gustafsson (2009) recalls how her fellow 
                                                 
7 According to the life-cycle theory of savings—developed by Franco Modigliani and Richard 
Brumberg—there is a connection between specific cohort behavior and aggregate savings and 
consumption. Bentzel (1959) shows that, in the case of positive productivity growth, there will   5 
researchers considered her presumptuous when she sent her dissertation (written 
in Swedish with an English summary) to the famous Jacob Mincer at Columbia 
University together with a letter thanking him for his inspiration. In addition, 
Anders Klevmarken wrote his dissertation in English, but his main results were 
never published in a journal. When he visited the RAND Corporation’s Finis 
Welch, a world-leading scholar in Klevmarken’s field, a few years later, Welch 
picked Klevmarken’s dissertation up off the shelf and frankly declared it an 
example of how a dissertation should not be written if people want their 
research to receive the attention it deserves (Klevmarken 2009). 
 
The relatively modest attention accorded Birgitta Swedenborg for her 
pioneering work in data collection and research on multinational companies’ 
operations and significance provides another example. She herself notes 
(Swedenborg 2009, pp. 344–345): 
 
My dissertation contained many other things—it likely had enough 
material to inspire some academic papers in international journals. 
Research in this area was still in its infancy and my analyses were unique 
at this point in time. But such publication was prioritized by neither IUI nor 
myself.  
 
A list of IUI reprints in English shows that international publication of IUI 
research was not emphasized until the 1980s. In fact, it did not become standard 
practice for researchers at IUI/IFN to publish internationally until the 1990s.
8  
 
So how was an industrial survey bureau transformed into an eminent research 
institute? 
 
                                                                                                                                   
be a positive correlation between growth and savings due to higher lifetime resources, and 
therefore savings, of younger cohorts relative to the dissaving of retired cohorts. In his Nobel 
Prize lecture, Franco Modigliani (1986) acknowledges this contribution and names it ―the 
Bentzel effect.‖ 
8 A similar situation prevailed at university institutions throughout Sweden. Under the leadership 
of Assar Lindbeck, the Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) first began 
systematically publishing in international journals in the middle of the 1970s. This practice then 
spread to other institutions and institutes. Swedes who returned to Sweden after earning their 
doctorate in the USA in the beginning of the 1970s also exerted an important influence in this 
respect (Jonung 1992). 
   6 
Independence 
Scholarly independence is a prerequisite for high-quality academic research. 
This standard also became a natural part of IUI research, despite that trade and 
industry interest groups effected its founding, and that an employers’ 
confederation still provides base funding. The early efforts of Sigfrid Edström 
and Ingvar Svennilson were crucial in this regard. Both were extraordinarily 
powerful and forceful, and both had the ability to push through their demands. 
Despite resistance from employers’ organizations (Henriksson 1990), Edström 
succeeded in establishing the Institute. When Svennilson was appointed CEO, 
he had Edström’s full support to transform the survey bureau into a research 
institute, even though the transformation would result in more diffuse benefits 
for the Institute’s principals. There ran an obvious risk that research results 
would at times conflict with the principals’ interests. 
 
As articles and lectures from this time clearly illustrate, Svennilson was deeply 
convinced of the potential of economic research to contribute to better general 
living conditions. He was also sure that Swedish industry underpinned this 
process (see, for example, Svennilson 1942a, 1942b). 
 
Several consequences followed naturally from the decision to convert IUI into a 
research institute: studies would have to fulfill requirements of scholarly quality; 
it would be necessary to accept long-term and time-consuming projects; and—
most importantly—it would be necessary to accept and even require research 
results to be published. As Jan Wallander (2009, p. 67) writes: 
 
One can say that the principle of publication was the most crucial. In 
following that principle, it soon became apparent that requirements of 
quality would be fulfilled—one could never suspect that less ―appropriate‖ 
results were suppressed. 
 
Jan Wallander personally experienced what Svennilson’s defense for this 
principle entailed. Wallander had just finished collecting primary data for a 
study financed by the company Uddeholm about the depopulation of the 
province of Wermland’s forested areas. Headed by Swedish businessman Nils 
Danielsen, the company pressed Jan Wallander to end the study and place what   7 
he had finished so far ‖in the desk drawer.‖
9 Svennilson reacted immediately 
and forcefully, making it clear to Danielsen that IUI was a research institute and 
that Uddeholm was in no position to bar publication of any results. 
 
Another person central to the development of IUI was Erik Dahmén, whose 
influence on the Institute began in the early 1940s and continued for another 50 
years. Because Dahmén wrote his doctoral dissertation at IUI during 
Svennilson’s time as CEO, he was present when Svennilson launched and 
defended the immutable principle of scholarly publication. Dahmén became 
acting director in 1949 and earned his doctorate in 1950. In the IUI book 
Industriproblem 1950, he wrote (pp. 7–8): 
 
It was already clear from the start that [IUI’s work] had to be pursued 
apolitically and on a scientific basis in order to serve its purpose. … 
Limiting tasks to service-related surveys would apart from this fact [the 
difficulty of recruiting qualified staff] be hard to carry out, however. It 
would also be unsuitable for another reason, namely that research activity of 
a more long-term quality is a prerequisite for effective service activity. 
 
Dahmén thereby clearly established that scholarship and its subsequent 
publication were necessary for securing high quality analysis. At this point, 
Dahmén became personal advisor to Swedish industry’s premier Marcus 
Wallenberg (1899–1982), a position he would hold for the remainder of 
Wallenberg’s life. In 1950, Marcus Wallenberg began his 25-year-long 
chairmanship of the IUI board. The anniversary volume offers a large number of 
examples of how Wallenberg defended both researchers’ academic freedom and 
the principle that even unappreciated results would be published—
unconditionally. In one case described in the volume, Wallenberg sanctioned the 
publication of results (of an inquiry that he had commissioned and financed) that 
strongly went against his own interests. 
 
While presiding over the Centre for Business and Policy Studies 
(Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, SNS), Jan Wallander established the 
same principles there, and later implemented and consolidated these principles 
                                                 
9 The whole incident is described in Wallander (1997, pp. 202–205). At this time, Nils Danielsen 
was also a member of the IUI board. In addition, he was chairman of the Federation of Swedish 
Industries (Industriförbundet) in 1947–49.   8 
as CEO at IUI from 1953 to 1961. Åke Sundström
10 recalls how Jan Wallander 
often quoted philosopher Benjamin Höijer in order to strengthen morale, 
especially his answer to a friend who warned about the perils of unbiased 
thinking: ―Seek the truth! And if it leads you to the gates of hell, knock on the 
door.‖ 
 
Several essays in the volume illustrate how IUI CEOs have defended 
researchers against outside pressure (often with the support of the chairman of 
the board). Perhaps the best known example of this occurred when Sven 
Hammarskiöld, CEO of the company Sockerbolaget (the Swedish sugar 
monopoly), resigned his post on the board in protest against Odd Gulbrandsen’s 
and Assar Lindbeck’s investigation of agricultural policy (Gulbrandsen and 
Lindbeck 1966; see also Lindbeck 2009). Another telling example is Bo 
Carlsson’s starkly critical contribution to public debate in the mid-1970s about 
industry’s ―12 Nuclear Reactor Program,‖ which came highly recommended by 
then ASEA CEO and later IUI chairman (1984–93) Curt Nicolin.
11 
 
Arriving at the Institute as a researcher in 1948, Jan Wallander’s successor 
Ragnar Bentzel was schooled in the same spirit of academic freedom. In his 
account, Villy Bergström (2009) highlights Bentzel’s qualities as an intellectual 
leader, inspiration, and discussion partner, among other things. Göran Albinsson 
Bruhner (2009, p. 202) describes him (―Naja‖) in the following manner: 
 
Naja’s leadership style was a pure reflection of his warm and generous 
personality. In my memories, Naja stands out as one of the least egocentric 
people I have ever met. Assured of the scope and depth of his own confidence, 
he supported his novices and let them receive the honor of grasping ideas and 
analyses that actually emanated from himself. 
 
In describing Bentzel, Gunnar Törnqvist (2009b) even draws parallels to the 
physicist Niels Bohr and his legendary Institute in 1920s Copenhagen.
12 
 
                                                 
10 In private e-mail correspondence with the article’s author, December 5, 2008. 
11 See, for example, Carlsson (1977). 
12 The German physicist Erwin Schrödinger coined the term Kopenhagener Geist to describe 
this legendary research environment.   9 
Societal relevance 
Because of IUI’s close connection to Swedish industry, policy relevance and 
social value guided the Institute in setting its research agenda. The so-called 
third objective,
13 which was only incorporated into university research in later 
years, has been a given at IUI since its inception. 
 
IUI scholars were motivated by their interest in Swedish industry rather than 
methodology. They were inspired by the knowledge that their research was 
significant in a wider setting, outside the academic world. This fits well with 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1996) thesis, namely that productive creativity—innovative 
work that has broad impact and is generally recognized—arises when three 
elements interact: the field, the individual, and the expertise. The latter two 
determine who gains access to the field. Csikszentmihalyi studies why painting, 
architecture, and sculpture suddenly exhibited such creativity in 15
th century 
Florence. In all likelihood, a larger amount of gifted artisans did not live there 
and then than at any other place or time. Instead, two conditions had changed: 
the field had been transformed through the rediscovery of classical knowledge, 
and demand among Florence’s ruling class had suddenly shifted to art and 
architecture.
14 Combined with greatly increasing demand from sophisticated 
buyers, productive creativity blossomed. 
 
Drawing an analogy to today’s research is not as far-fetched as one might think. 
The academic freedom that prevails in a good research environment entices 
researchers to spontaneously migrate to areas where demand for analysis and 
new findings is great. This demand arises from a complicated interplay between 
societal progress, the feasibility of researching certain issues, and what potential 
financiers are prepared to support. To a large extent, IUI research is driven by 
external demands and stimuli rather than being mostly determined by 
academia’s internal acceptance. Yet, the academic research community 
constitutes an important part of the demand, namely the demand for research of 
                                                 
13 The first two objectives are research and teaching. The third objective refers to collaboration 
with surrounding society and the act of disseminating research outside academia. This objective 
became Swedish law on July 1, 2009, through a change in the Higher Education Act 
(Högskolelagen). 
14 See Eliasson and Eliasson (1997) for an analysis of the crucial role of buyers’ competence in 
the artistic creativity of 15
th century Florence.    10 
high academic quality. Two other successful Swedish research environments—
the Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) and the Research 
Department of the Swedish Central Bank (Riksbankens forskningsavdelning)—
are also largely guided by societal relevance when selecting their research 
problems. 
 
The researchers’ conviction that IUI’s work was significant and made a 
difference was fundamental to its success. Indeed, Klamer and Colander (1990) 
came to a similar conclusion when researching the personal development of 
doctoral students at leading American universities. They found that doctoral 
students at the University of Chicago were the most satisfied because professors 
succeeded in conveying the importance of what the students researched and 
learned. Incidentally, the University of Chicago has also fostered the largest 
number of Nobel laureates in economics (Törnqvist 2009a, ch. 11). 
 
Perhaps this spirit—stemming from something as basic as a keen interest in 
social matters—is more durable than the fellowship formed in certain research 
groups around specific methods or more confined issues. 
 
 
The IUI spirit 
The fact that researchers felt free to seek answers to the best of their ability 
when a project was approved by the board (the prevailing procedure up until the 
mid-1990s) was crucial to IUI’s success. The ―IUI spirit,‖ described by so many 
contributors to the anniversary volume, could in turn develop through the 
Institute’s great resources and well-administered workplace, especially when 
compared to universities. 
 
The IUI spirit cannot be easily defined, but I believe it originated in the 
researchers’ knowledge that neither director nor financier or principal could 
violate their integrity as scholars. At the same time, the researchers’ work ethic 
had to be such that they were not tempted to abuse this privilege by 
underperforming either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
   11 
In this regard, team spirit became especially important. IUI researchers felt 
proud of their Institute, and so took responsibility for advancing each other’s 
research through sometimes heavy-handed yet essentially constructive 
critique.
15 Lunch and coffee breaks served as informal seminars, and both 
formal weekly meetings and multi-day workshops at alpine hotels or other 
secluded places were held where every detail of extensive manuscripts was 
painstakingly penetrated. No hierarchy applied there. The opinions of Ragnar 
Bentzel and Research Director Erik Höök may have carried particular weight 
because of their acumen and expertise, but their own research was reviewed in 
the same rigorous, frank fashion as everyone else’s (Vinell 2009). 
 
The Institute did not have an elaborate formal hierarchy, which led to a lack of 
the internal competition for positions that marks most universities. As a result, 
IUI was spared from destructive fights over academic turf. Moreover, IUI had 
the freedom to recruit researchers whose interests and subject area harmonized 
with the Institute; these new researchers would then contribute to the Institute in 
its entirety. This contrasted sharply with governmental institutes’ inflexible rules 
in regard to job appointments. Indeed, IUI’s flexibility enabled the creation of 
research groups composed of individuals who were genuinely interested in their 
colleagues’ research and also had the expertise to give useful feedback. 
 
Other features also distinguished IUI from institutions of higher education. The 
first was the presence of multidisciplinary competence in the same corridor. 
Economists who worked with empirical material, for instance, could easily get 
help from statisticians. Until the 1960s, the IUI research staff included the 
disciplines of sociology, law, economic geography, agricultural economics, and 
business administration.  
 
IUI’s third distinguishing feature was its infrastructure. In the present age of 
personal computers and the Internet, all researchers have access to powerful 
tools for computation, editing, and seeking information. But not long ago, IUI 
researchers had the advantage of being able to receive extensive internal 
                                                 
15 See especially Erik Ruist (2009) and Bengt Rydén (2009).   12 
assistance with routine tasks. IUI’s support staff performed a multitude of time-
consuming tasks, such as manually computing regressions, typing letters and 
manuscripts, coding questionnaires, and so forth, leaving the researchers with 
more time to explore questions in depth. 
 
IUI also invested extensively in various analytical tools. During the 1970s and 
the 1980s, IUI developed three econometric models of the Swedish economy. 
The models were based on radically different premises, and could be used to 
give alternate predictions of the effects of different economic policy measures. 
Gunnar Eliasson (2009, p. 143) writes: 
 
The models provided different answers to nearly every question that was put 
to them, which clearly illustrated what a priori conditions signify for all 
analytical results, including the extent of uncertainty and not least how little 
policymakers know about the likely effects of their measures. 
 
Researchers were perhaps not always aware of their privileged position while 
still at IUI, but they tended to see things differently after moving to ―more 
normal‖ environments. Lars Lidén (2009, p. 256) provides a telling illustration: 
 
Later in life, I sat on the boards of various governmental investigations 
with politically recruited chairmen, with directives that had been 
formulated in some ministry and where all committee members had been 
recruited along strict partisan lines. I often thought then with a tinge of 
regret about how unbureaucratic and accepting things had been at IUI. 
Perhaps more so than before, I realized the value of having a private, non-
partisan research institute within the confederation of Swedish enterprise. 
 
Surroundings and mobility among researchers 
Gunnar Törnqvist, a professor of economic geography at Lund University who 
was active at IUI during the mid-1960s, has recently conducted research on the 
characteristics of creative research environments (Törnqvist 2009a). In his 
contribution to the anniversary volume, Törnqvist (2009b) applies these insights 
to his own experiences at IUI. He maintains that successful research 
environments are clearly elitist, yet not in its formal meaning (hierarchical 
ambition) but rather in how they strive to be best in comparison with outside 
actors. These environments are filled with people who are passionate about the 
research problems they have chosen. 
   13 
Inventive researchers with genuine, field-specific scientific competence are 
attracted to environments in which conditions for renewal and personal growth 
are favorable. In such environments, researchers can pose truly fruitful questions 
while remaining conscious of the boundaries between different specialties. 
 
Törnqvist (2009b, pp. 296–297, italics in original) also writes that: 
 
International surveys show that creativity develops best in small, egalitarian 
organizations … At the same time, it is of great advantage for these small 
environments to be surrounded and supported by strong economic resources. The 
ideal size of a creative environment varies, but groups of four to seven 
researchers are common. Such small environments work best if they are included 




Upon closer examination of these [creative] environments, an apparently 
contradictory combination of cooperation and rivalry appears. In such blessed 
places it is possible to have generosity, equality, and competition at the same 
time… In my time, some researchers had greater influence than others. But their 
intellectual authority did not depend on formal positions, but rather on richness of 
ideas, knowledge, and their ability to inspire others. IUI was not an arena for 
internal competition. 
 
IUI researchers came to be characterized by two important aspects: mobility and 
turnover. In an organization lacking mobility and the influx of new people, both 
the conception of what is correct and the measure of what makes good research 
can easily stiffen—a sort of internal consensus emerges, leaving researchers 
contented with what they happen to be doing.
17 The influx of new competence 
and outside contacts prevents this from occurring; researchers are instead forced 
to pursue best practice. 
 
At the outset, this essay asked what was accomplished at IUI. For a research 
institute with high mobility and dynamism, the subsequent careers of former IUI 
staff—and how these careers were influenced by their time at IUI—form an 
important part of the answer. 
 
                                                 
16 Stockholm and Uppsala today are characterized by high quality postgraduate programs in 
economics and several distinguished research environments. In spring 2009, there were slightly 
more than 280 active researchers with doctorates in economics (including finance) and roughly 
210 doctoral students at Stockholm and Uppsala.  
17 Cf. Klein and Stern’s (2009) analysis of how American elite universities nearly exclusively 
recruit from one another. At the same time, this inner circle decides what is worth researching 
and what is good research; the risk of creating a closed system is obvious.   14 
IUI research has been propagated as researchers have moved to new academic 
environments. One example is Bo Carlsson, whose experiences, insights, and 
contacts garnered at IUI laid the foundation for his subsequent research at Case 
Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. Bo Carlsson was also the 
driving force behind the establishment of the new field of Industrial Dynamics 
(Carlsson 2009). 
 
It is easy to find more examples. Albert Danielsson and Ove Granstrand have 
played an important role in advancing the role of economic research at 
Sweden’s two leading institutes of technology. Bengt-Christer Ysander’s move 
from IUI to a professorship at Uppsala University initiated a substantial shake-
up of the research environment there. Lars Lundberg became the first professor 
of economics at Örebro University and has since built a research group in 
international economics there. Jan Södersten became professor at Uppsala 
University and later the leading expert of corporate taxation, and has guided a 
large number of doctorate students in this area. Likewise, Bertil Holmlund 
became professor at Uppsala and established one of Europe’s leading research 
environments within labor economics. In 2008 he also became chairman of the 
Nobel Prize Committee. Anders Björklund became professor at Stockholm 
University and a leading authority on intergenerational income mobility. Margit 
Cassel and Karin Kock were the first women in Sweden to earn doctorates in 
economics (in 1924 and 1929); Siv Gustafsson was the third (in 1976). She later 
became a pioneer in feminist economics and thereafter professor at the 
University of Amsterdam, where she formed her own research group 
(Gustafsson 2009). 
 
Throughout the 1970s, IUI researchers played an important role as expert 
examiners and critics of the effects of an increasingly complicated and 
distortionary tax system. Ulf Jakobsson and Göran Normann demonstrated that 
the so-called Haga Agreements (1974–75), in which the government and social 
partners (trade unions and the employers’ confederation) agreed to exchange 
lower income tax for higher social security contributions, would not exert the 
positive effects claimed by its proponents. Göran Normann illustrated the 
impossibility of using a production factor tax to shift the tax burden from   15 
personal income tax to levying more taxes ―directly on production‖ instead 
(Normann 2009). Together with the research performed by Jan Södersten and 
several other IUI researchers, these analyses figured greatly for Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO) chairman Stig Malm and Minister of Finance Kjell-
Olof Feldt, who explained to a startled audience in a November 1988 press 
conference that the Swedish tax system was ―rotten‖ and ―perverse.‖
18 
 
Researchers applied their IUI schooling in critical, well-founded research in 
other settings after they left the Institute. For example, Bengt Rydén (2009, pp. 
329–330) writes:  
 
My schooling in research at IUI became crucial for my entire subsequent 
professional life. I was trained to formulate problems, evaluate 
relevance, consider things from different perspectives, pose questions, 
and be systematic and structured in my own work. ―Why can’t it be the 
opposite?‖ represented an approach that I acquired then that followed me 
throughout my entire life, often to the chagrin of my colleagues. 
 
Similar formulations can be found in several of the contributions written by 
people who pursued a purely business-oriented career after their time at IUI; 
see, for example, Staffan Håkanson (2009) and Jan Wallander (2009). 
 
Åke Ortmark (2009, p. 239) relates how he retained the same thinking when he 
entered into journalism: ―The great lesson from the Institute was that one cannot 
be careless when speaking about something as important as reality.‖ Together 
with professional economist Herbert Söderström, Ortmark introduced the so-
called hard-hitting form of journalism (skjutjärnsjournalistiken) that 
fundamentally changed Swedish journalists’ way of treating the powerful and 
their motives. 
 
IUI also influenced another organization that set the tone of policy discussions 
and business research in postwar Sweden: the Centre for Business and Policy 
Studies (SNS). Two of the three main architects behind SNS—Axel Iveroth and 
Tore Browaldh—had been schooled at IUI, and Jan Wallander, SNS’s first 
actual president, had written his dissertation at the Institute. When Wallander 
became head of IUI in 1953, fellow IUI researcher Hans B. Thorelli filled his 
                                                 
18 Feldt (1991, p. 386).    16 
shoes as president of SNS; after him, IUI researcher Torsten Carlsson became 
president. After an interlude of two short-lived presidents, Göran Albinsson 
Bruhner and later Bengt Rydén headed SNS. Thus, for nearly 30 of SNS’s first 
36 years, the organization was headed by former IUI researchers (Ullenhag 
1998). Stefan Lundgren, the president of SNS from 2003 to 2009, was active at 
IUI at the end of the 1980s. In later years, IUI researchers Birgitta Swedenborg 
and Pontus Braunerhjelm also held leading posts at SNS. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the existence and success of IUI was 
decisive in LO’s 1981 congress decision to consider the possibility of 
establishing a trade union-based institute of economic research. Among those 
conducting the investigation was Bengt-Christer Ysander, a senior researcher at 
IUI at the time.
19 The investigation (Swedish Trade Union Confederation 1984) 
presented its report in 1984; one year later, the Trade Union Institute for 
Economic Research (FIEF) was founded, with previous IUI researcher Villy 
Bergström at its head.
20 According to Villy Bergström (1997, p. 8), LO needed  
 
an interface towards the research community. Industry had had it ever 
since the establishment of the Industrial Institute for Economic and 
Social Research (IUI). Nearly all Swedish economists had worked at IUI 
at some point or had been in contact with the Institute. As a result, 
industry had extensive contacts among leading researchers.  
 
The alumni list in the anniversary volume includes about 230 previous IUI 
researchers in total. A fourth of these researchers pursued subsequent careers in 
the business sector (including the media) and another fourth worked in the 
public sector; about 35 percent continued their academic careers elsewhere, 




In connection with the 70
th anniversary of IFN/IUI, a large number of previous 
IUI researchers were invited to write personal essays about what their time at 
                                                 
19 In this regard, see the contribution by IUI’s then CEO Gunnar Eliasson (2009, p. 144). 
20 Given its limited resources, FIEF was exceptionally successful in many ways, especially 
during the institute’s first ten years—see Bergström (1997). Because of the decline of 
unionization and the resultant drop in revenue, FIEF was dismantled at the end of 2005 after 20 
years of existence.    17 
IUI meant for their professional and personal development. This resulted in an 
extensive collection, which constitutes the main source of this account. 
 
In this essay, I have attempted to document IUI’s success and importance. The 
evolution of the Institute constitutes an example of the ―sociology and 
professionalization of economics‖ (Coats 1993). Its significance for Swedish 
social science research and policy discussion is striking. But it becomes 
increasingly difficult to review IUI’s accomplishments as we near the present 
day. Likewise, doing so is doubly difficult for somebody who is deeply engaged 
in the Institute’s current activities. For this reason, the most recent decades have 
not been discussed in detail. 
 
IUI was founded when industry realized that economic research may be useful. 
The account shows that there may be a close cooperation between such 
institutes, universities, and government. The Institute has regularly been 
engaged in government reports and many doctoral dissertations have been 
written at IUI and defended at the universities. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
when political polarization was strong in the whole Western world, 
collaboration with government ceased. International publication—a step in the 
process of professionalization—became emphasized in the 1980s. 
 
Which factors were key to the Institute’s success? The first decisive condition 
was the existence of a handful of individuals who possessed a clear vision for 
what they wanted to accomplish and the ability to implement this vision, 
coupled with a vibrant interest in social matters. From the very start, they aimed 
to satisfy both the principals’ and other financiers’ demands for relevance and 
researchers’ and academia’s demands for integrity and high scientific quality.  
 
The Institute never deviated from a number of important and immutable 
principles that were established at its inception. The most important of these was 
that all results would be unconditionally published once they passed careful peer 
scrutiny to ascertain that quality standards were met.
21 Researchers in turn 
                                                 
21 While this may seem self-evident today, it is still not always the case. See, for example, 
Mandel (1999), who discusses the danger involved in economic researchers’ lucrative consulting   18 
assumed a strong sense of self-confidence, inspiring them to seek the truth to the 
best of their ability, and to publish their findings irrespective of which interests 
they challenged. 
 
The Institute’s management also succeeded in establishing a creative research 
environment. IUI lacked formal hierarchies; it was everyone’s collective 
responsibility to boost the quality of researchers’ reports via demanding formal 
and informal reviews. The Institute’s creativity also gained from the influx of 
new researchers who had contacts outside its sphere. 
 
The IUI spirit was not connected to a particular theory, method, or school of 
thought. Rather, it was based upon a distinctive approach to economic problems, 
namely that all of the Institute’s research problems should have broad, non-
academic relevance. As a result, people beyond academia came to demand IUI’s 
research, including financiers, politicians, and leading actors in business and 
enterprise. IUI thrived in part because of this outside demand, which has been 
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  At IUI  Subsequent Career in Brief 
Göran Albinsson 
Bruhner 
1955–66  President, Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS); Editor, Svenska Dagbladet; Editor-in-Chief, Dagens 
Industri; Senior Columnist, Svenska Dagbladet.  
Ragnar Bentzel  1948–52, CEO 
1961–66 
Associate Professor, Uppsala University; Professor, Stockholm School of Economics; Professor, Uppsala University. 
Had a leading role in several government inquiries and commissions in the 1950s and 60s.  
Villy Bergström  1965–69  Lecturer, Uppsala University; Founder and President, Trade Union Institute of Economic Research; Editor-in-Chief, 
Tiden and Dala-Demokraten; Vice Governor, Swedish Central Bank. Has been an influential Social-Democratic 
opinion leader since the 1960s. 
Anders Björklund  1983–89  Professor, Stockholm University. 
Pontus 
Braunerhjelm 
1989–99  Vice President, Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS); Professor of International Business and 
Entrepreneurship, Royal Institute of Technology; Head, Ministry of Education Globalization Council (2007–09); 
President, Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum (2008–). 
Tore Browaldh  1944–45  General Secretariat of the European Council, Strasbourg; Vice President, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SAF); 
President and subsequently Chairman, Handelsbanken. Co-founder of the Center for Business and Policy Studies 
(SNS). 
Bo Carlsson  1972–84  Professor, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio. 
Erik Dahmén  1942–50  Professor, Stockholm School of Economics; advisor to Marcus Wallenberg and Stockholms Enskilda Bank.  
J. Sigfrid Edström  Chairman 1939–43   President and subsequently Chairman, Asea 1903–49; Chairman, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SAF). 
Founder of IUI. Legendary leader in Swedish industry and in the international sports movement, notably chairman of 
the International Olympic Committee 1946–52. 
Gunnar Eliasson  1965–69, CEO 
1976–1994 
Chief Economist, Federation of Swedish Industries (1970–75); Professor, Royal Institute of Technology; Research 
Scholar, Ratio Institute. 
Ove Granstrand  1981–93  Professor of Industrial Management and Economics at Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg.  
Odd Gulbrandsen  1952–57, 1967–69  Associate Professor, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (Ultuna), 1958–66. FAO; Research Director, 
UNCTAD; Professor of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (Ultuna).  
Siv Gustafsson  1967–80  Research Scholar, Institute for Working Life; Professor of Gender Economics, University of Amsterdam. 
Bertil Holmlund  1976–85  Associate Professor, Umeå University; Research Scholar, Trade Union Institute of Economic Research (FIEF); 
Professor, Uppsala University. 
Erik Höök  1948–62  Head of Planning and Medium Term Surveys, Ministry of Finance; President, Jernkontoret (Swedish Steel Producers' 
Association). 
Axel Iveroth  1939–46  Editor-in-Chief, Industria; Intelligence Officer, Swedish Embassy, Washington D.C.; Vice President, Cementa; 
President, Federation of Swedish Industries. Co-founder of the Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS). 
Ulf Jakobsson  1970–76, 1994–
2005 
Head of Planning and Medium Term Surveys, Ministry of Finance; Chief Economist, Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise (SAF); Handelsbanken; Federation of Swedish Industries. 
Anders Klevmarken  1968–76  Professor, Gothenburg University (Statistics and Econometrics); Professor of Econometrics at Uppsala University. 
Lars Lidén  1957–61  Federation of Swedish Industries, 1961–64. Subsequent career at Esselte (a multinational office supplies   23 
manufacturer), where he was deputy CEO until 1991. 
Assar Lindbeck  1962–63, 1966–68, 
1995– 
Professor, Stockholm School of Economics; Professor, Stockholm University; Director, Institute of International 
Economic Studies (IIES).  
Lars Lundberg  1969–72, 1989–91  Lecturer and Associate Professor, Umeå University; Research Scholar, Trade Union Institute of Economic Research; 
Professor, Örebro University. 
Curt Nicolin  Chairman 1985–93  President and subsequently Chairman of Asea/ABB; Chairman, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SAF).  
Göran Normann  1972–81  Research Manager, Federation of Swedish Industries; Principal Administrator, Public Management Service; Head of 
the Fiscal Affairs Division, OECD, Paris. 
Åke Ortmark  1954–58  Economic commentator and journalist, Swedish Radio and the Swedish public service television company (SVT); 
Editor-in-Chief, Veckans Affärer; Writer, senior journalist, TV8, Axess-TV etc. Arguably the most renowned TV 
journalist in Sweden with a career in television spanning more than 50 years. 
Bengt Rydén  1966–70  Editor-in-Chief, Veckans Affärer; President, Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS); President, Stockholm 
Stock Exchange. 
John Skår  1964–70  Lecturer, Stockholm University; Professor and Dean, Bodö Business School; Professor and Head of Center for 
Medical Innovations at Karolinska Institute, Solna. Co-founder, Stockholm School of Entrepreneurship (SSES). 
Åke Sundström  1959–63, 1967–68  Key positions in the Ministries of Finance and Industry.  
Ingvar Svennilson  1941–49  Professor, Stockholm University; Director, Institute of International Economic Studies (IIES). Pioneered medium term 
surveys in the Ministry of Finance; author of Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, a monumental study 
of European economic development in the interwar period commissioned by the United Nations European 
Commission for Europe. 
Birgitta Swedenborg  1969–81, 1986–90  Expert Group on Public Finance (ESO), the Ministry of Finance; Economist, PK-Banken; Vice President, Center for 
Business and Policy Studies (SNS). 
Jan Södersten  1975–89  Professor and Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences, Uppsala University. 
Hans B. Thorelli  1945–50  President, Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS). Marketing Services Research, General Electric, New York; 
Professor of Management, University of Chicago and Indiana University. 
Gunnar Törnqvist  1963–66  Professor of Economic Geography, Lund Unversity. 
Jan Wallander  1945–49, CEO 
1953–61 
Research Director and President, Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS), 1950–53; President, 
Sundsvallsbanken and Handelsbanken; Chairman, Handelsbanken. Writer of numerous books on management. 
Leading sponsor of economic research through the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. 
Marcus Wallenberg  Chairman 1950–
75, Honorary 
Chairman 1975–82 
President and subsequently Chairman, Stockholms Enskilda Bank; Head of the Wallenberg sphere from 1946 until his 
death. The most powerful representative of Swedish industry in the postwar period.  
Lars Wohlin  1960–72, CEO 
1973–1976 
Chief Economist, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SAF), 1973–76; Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance; 
Governor of the Swedish Central Bank; President, Stadshypotek; and European Union Parliamentarian. 
Bengt-Christer 
Ysander 
1978–87  Professor, Uppsala University. 
Note: The field of professorships is only indicated if it is not Economics. Information about a person mentioned in the main text is not repeated. 